

null  
Diana T Fritz 03/20/2007 04:13:29 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results

Cable  
Text:

CONFIDENTIAL

SIPDIS  
TELEGRAM

October 15, 2003

To: No Action Addressee  
Action: Unknown  
From: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 4612 - ROUTINE)  
TAGS: PREL, PGOV  
Captions: None  
Subject: UAE OFFICIAL ADVISES USG TO ALLOW IRAQ GOVERNING  
COUNCIL TO EXERCISE MORE AUTHORITY  
Ref: None

---

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 04612

SIPDIS  
CXABU:  
ACTION: POL  
INFO: RSO AMB DCM P/M ECON

DISSEMINATION: POL  
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: CDA: RALBRIGHT  
DRAFTED: ECON: OBJOHN  
CLEARED: NONE

VZCZCADI685  
RR RUEHC RUCNRAQ RHMFISS RUCAACC RUEKJCS RHEHNSC  
RUEAIIA RHEFDIA  
DE RUEHAD #4612 2881358  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
R 151358Z OCT 03  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2086  
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE  
RHMFISS/HQ COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTH BAGHDAD  
RUCAACC/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC  
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 004612

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA  
CENTCOM FOR POLAD  
DOD FOR OSD/NESA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/13  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [IZ](#) [TC](#)  
SUBJECT: UAE OFFICIAL ADVISES USG TO ALLOW IRAQ GOVERNING  
COUNCIL TO EXERCISE MORE AUTHORITY

(U) Classified by CDA Richard Albright for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: MFA Assistant Undersecretary for Political Affairs Abdullah Rashid Al-Noaimi stressed to Charge that it was in the best interests of the USG if the Iraq Governing Council

(IGC) was allowed to assume more authority. He expressed his concern that the Iraq Governing Council (IGC) was being viewed as a puppet regime, and that its inability to make decisions undercut its legitimacy with the Iraqi people. End Summary.

¶2. (C) On October 14, Charge and econchief met with MFA Assistant Undersecretary for Political Affairs Abdullah Rashid Al-Noaimi. During the course of the meeting, Al-Noaimi said that he wanted to convey UAEG concern on the need for the Iraqis to assume more authority. He said that he thought that the USG and the UAEG agreed on the principle that the Iraqis needed to be encouraged to lead themselves, but added this did not appear to be the case in fact. He saw a contradiction between our desire to have the Iraqis "in charge" and the widespread perception that we were not giving them any authority.

¶3. (C) Al-Noaimi noted that the longer it took the IGC to be seen as playing the leading role in governing Iraq, the harder it became for the coalition and for the IGC itself. He said that the UAE did not want to see an internal conflict in Iraq or worse, a military conflict, and urged that the USG give the IGC more visible authority. The bottom line was that the Iraqis needed to be seen to be in charge.

¶4. (C) The Charge asked whether Al-Noaimi had specific examples to illustrate his concern. Al-Noaimi answered that Ambassador Bremer's statement that it was up to him and not the IGC to determine whether Turkish troops would deploy was not helpful. He added that he didn't think that countries in the region (specifically listing the GCC, Jordan, Syria, and Iran) would welcome Turkish troop deployments. A Turkish troop deployment would exacerbate the internal Iraqi situation and Iraqi - Turkish relations. He stated that while the GCC had not formally discussed the matter of Turkish troop deployments, GCC member states have been expressing concerns about the matter.

¶5. (C) In general, Al Noaimi expressed his concern that the IGC was not being seen as in charge, which helped reinforce the public's perception that it was a puppet organization. He admitted that this might be, in part, a problem of public perception. In other words, the Iraqis were exercising authority, but not communicating this well. For example, he noted that he had not seen much press reporting about Iraqi Governing Council deliberations and decisions. He speculated, however, that the Iraqis might not believe that they were allowed to exercise authority and were thus not taking the initiative.

¶6. (C) He stressed that the Iraqi people needed to feel that they were having some say over their lives. The security situation combined with the (perceived or actual) inability of the government to exercise authority undercut Iraqi support for the government and denied it legitimacy. The danger was that such a situation would encourage troublemakers such as Maqtada Sadr to attempt to fill the void. He stated that it was in the USG's interest to have the Iraqis exercise some authority in order to increase their legitimacy. He also said that he was concerned that the current situation attracted opponents of the U.S. (including possibly UAE nationals) to Iraq to fight U.S. troops. He said "we don't want to be in the situation where some of our citizens are fighting your citizens in Iraq" and added it would be far better if the Iraqis handle more of their own security.

¶7. (C) Comment: The UAEG views a secure and stabile Iraq (one that can counterbalance Iran) as a national security priority. To that end, they have striven to support the IGC politically and poured \$80 to \$100 million into humanitarian relief and support for coalition deployments. At the same time, however, they want to see the U.S. do more to enhance the IGC's credibility. In recent meetings with Assistant Secretary Burns, de facto Foreign Minister Hamdan bin Zayed Al-Nahyan and Chief of Staff of the UAE Armed Forces Mohamed bin Zayed raised similar concerns about the lack of IGC credibility. End Comment.

ALBRIGHT